Housing Meltdown: Who do we blame?
While the New York Times blames President Bush, a reaction that is fully expected, others are making a more detailed and non-partisan analysis of the mortgage crisis. What changed to cause the rapid rise in home prices that, in turn, increased speculation in the housing market?
Speculative real estate crashes in the past have usually hurt the investor class; income property suddenly can’t be “flipped” and the investors lose their shirts. This time the investor class was not the only victim. We find ourselves in a mortgage default crisis for owner-occupied single family homes, even in an era of low interest rates. That’s a new phenomenon.
Part of the issue has to be the government-forced expansion of home lending rules to allow more to qualify for home loans. In essence, this practice made single family home owners speculators, people betting that they could hang on to the home they could not afford under the old rules based on prices rising and interest rates falling. The Belmont Club quotes a report on this at The March of Folly:
This report concludes that, in an attempt to increase home ownership, particularly by minorities and the less affluent, virtually every branch of the government undertook an attack on underwriting standards starting in the early 1990s. Regulators, academic specialists, GSEs, and housing activists universally praised the decline in mortgage-underwriting standards as an “innovation” in mortgage lending. This weakening of underwriting standards succeeded in increasing home ownership and also the price of housing, helping to lead to a housing price bubble. The price bubble, along with relaxed lending standards, allowed speculators to purchase homes without putting their own money at risk.
Its easy to see the free market at work here; by increasing the pool of potential buyers, you increase demand. The price goes up. At some point, saturation is reached, and the prices soften. Those who are over-leveraged and cannot ride out the storm default. Prices go down.
But this is no ordinary market-based cycle. Because the government established rules that forced lenders to take more risk than they would have before, the natural brake for lenders was no longer there.
Bailout money is flowing from Washington as fast as they can print it. But we should pause and ask ourselves just what is being bailed out. If a person put zero down on a home they ultimately cannot afford, what financial damage have they really incurred? They haven’t lost their down payment. If they are in default, they have not made three or four monthly payments that, probably, makes up for the difference between renting and buying over a 12 month period. If they have to rent again, they simply return to the same position they were in prior to the “housing bubble”.
That’s not to say there isn’t a lot of emotional trauma involved. People who thought they had a shot at home ownership see it slipping away. They struggle to move payments, work a second job, fight with their spouse over minor purchases, etc. But from a financial standpoint, those in this situation are not really harmed and should not be compensated by other hard working Americans.
It is not the lack of government oversight or regulation that was the problem but rather new regulations that ignored market realities. Instead of realizing that, I fear we will simply add more layers of regulation on top of the ones there now. That doesn’t bode well for actually correcting the underlying problem: kind social policy is often no substitute for clear-eyed market realities.
And in the end, the market always wins.